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1. Introduction 
Earnings Management (EM) is an accounting process that managers adopt to manipulate the 
earnings of the company through accounting choices and discretionary accruals. Over the last 
two decades, a large number of studies have examined the nuances of how managers manage 
earnings. In most cases, EM occurs when managers have the flexibility to choose the 
accounting methods, such as revenue recognition, depreciating expenses and employing 
discretion in financial reporting, to estimate accruals and to alter financial reports (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999). EM behaviour can be classified as: (1) misreporting EM, involving the 
discretionary accounting of decisions and outcomes already realized; and (2) direct or real EM, 
involving the strategic timing of investment, sales, expenditure and financing decisions 
(Degeorge et al., 1999). A considered view suggests that EM involves either aggressive or 
conservative accounting procedures, used within the GAAP framework to bring about a desired 
level of reported earnings that often mislead the users of financial information (Davidson III et 
al., 2007, p. 369). Most previous studies on the relationship between EM and CEOs’ individual 
characteristics (such as gender, age and overconfidence) focus on developed countries (e.g. 
Davidson III et al., 2007; Hribar and Yang, 2010; Peni and Vähämaa, 2010; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Bozanic et al., 2013). Considering this bias, we examine the relationship 
between EM practices and CEOs’ characteristics in the context of the Middle East and 
particularly in Jordan. 
    In Jordan, many studies have examined how corporate governance factors may play a crucial 
role in monitoring EM practices (e.g. Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010; Abed et al., 2012; Alzoubi and 
Selamat, 2012; Alzoubi and Liu, 2016). Most found that corporate governance factors have a 
positive effect on monitoring the practices. Other studies empirically examined the practice of 
EM in Jordan. For example, Al-Momani (2006) found that most managers who engage in EM 
by take advantage of the flexibility available in the accounting standards. Hamad and Abu-
Nassar (2013) examined the income-smoothing effect of EM on the market return among 
Jordanian service and industrial companies, and identified the effect of EM practice on market 
returns. The key research question is: What is the influence of the CEO’s personal 
characteristics on EM practices among non-financial companies listed on the ASE? 
     Our study examines the impact of CEOs’ personal characteristics on EM, unlike earlier 
research which attempted to explain the relationship between EM practices and a variety of 
different factors. For example, Ji et al. (2015) investigated the effect of corporate governance 
and ownership reforms on earnings quality in China. Hu et al. (2015) examined the impact of 
managerial tenure on EM among Chinese companies. Alzoubi and Liu (2016) studied the 
relationship between ownership structure and EM among Jordanian companies. Thus, we 
contribute to the literature by providing another piece of evidence that personal managerial 
attributes influence EM practices.   
    The results of our empirical study indicate that CEO overconfidence affects EM practices. 
We used a sample of 201 non-financial Jordanian companies with 1,206 company-year 
observations, running different panel regressions of EM on a set of CEO characteristics and 
company-specific control variables. Our findings suggest that overconfident CEOs tend to 
engage in a high level of EM practices; this may be because they are less under the influence 
of stakeholders and regulators’ attempts to mitigate EM practices (Hsieh et al., 2014). The 
findings are consistent with the notion that overconfidence encourages managers to make more 
optimistic forecasts about the future of the company. Our results are broadly consistent with 
the previous findings (Hribar and Yang, 2010; Schrand and Zechman, 2012; Hsieh et al., 2014). 
However, we found no association between the CEO’s gender and EM practices, consistent 
with the findings of (Peni and Vähämaa, 2010).  
    Shedding light on the relationship between CEOs’ characteristics and EM practices, ours is 
the first such study on the Jordanian market. We expect the findings to be valuable to users of 
financial information and policy makers who are interested in increasing the reliability of 
financial reporting. This paper is divided into several sections. Section 2 a discussion of 
theoretical frameworks and reviews of the literature, which lead to hypothesis development. 
Section 3 explains the study model. Section 4 provides details of the data and research methods. 
Section 5 presents the findings, followed by conclusions.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and the development of a hypothesis 
A conflict of interest between agents and principals exists when agents (managers) undertake 
opportunistic actions to achieve their goals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Information 
asymmetry arises from this conflict of interests and motivates managers to engage in EM 
(Davidson et al., 2004; Jiraporn et al., 2008). Moreover, authors such as Trueman and Titman 
(1988) and Richardson (2000) have found a positive relationship between EM and asymmetric 
information, which indicates that the higher the level of asymmetry, the greater the possibility 
of EM activity. Similarly, Christie and Zimmerman (1994) reported that EM through 
accounting accruals is a sign of a conflict of interest in a manager’s decision making. In short, 
EM is considered as a by-product of the conflict of interest between ownership and managers 
that is ultimately disadvantageous to the company.  
     Liu and O’Farrell (2011) examined the impact of IFRS on EM among Chinese companies. 
Their findings indicate that EM has decreased in China since 2007 under the new set of 
standards. Waresul Karim et al. (2013) examined the link between three corporate governance 
characteristics (CEO-Chair duality, foreign equity participation and board ownership) and the 
audit quality choice made by IPO firms in Bangladesh. Their findings show that CEO-Chair 
duality and the degree of foreign equity participation are significant determinants of auditor 
choice, but that board ownership is not.  
    The last decade has seen a growth in research on the topic of managerial characteristics. 
According to Shefrin (2001), the physiological and sociological characteristics of managers 
may have an effect on various management decisions. Other studies show that CEOs’ personal 
characteristics influence different decisions, for example the CEO’s gender and risk-taking 
attitude (e.g.Byrnes et al., 1999), the CEO’s age and investment decisions (e.g. Li et al., 2011; 
Serfling, 2012), the CEO’s age and voluntary financial disclosure choices (Bamber et al., 
2010), the CEO’s overconfidence and corporate acquisitions (e.g. Brown and Sarma, 2007), 
the CEO’s overconfidence and capital structure decisions (Tomak, 2013), the CEO’s 
overconfidence and earnings forecast (Schrand and Zechman, 2012), and the CEO’s 
overconfidence and voluntary disclosure (e.g. Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Andriosopoulos et al., 
2013). Nevertheless, the relationship between a CEO’s personal characteristics and EM 
practices remains ambiguous and controversial. As such, the focus of the present study is to 
acquire an understanding of whether specific characteristics, namely gender, age and 
overconfidence, influence EM practices. 
   Previous studies claim that gender is likely to have an influence on a company’s decisions 
(Peni and Vähämaa, 2010; Abdul Hameed and Counsell, 2012). Several feminist economists 
argue that women are more inclined to be neutral in moral judgments and behaviour than are 
men (Nelson, 1996; Collins, 2000), while Barber and Odean (2001) and Nelson (2012) find 
them, on average, more inclined to be risk-averse than men in decision making. Hansemark 
(2003) provides evidence of a difference between men and women when taking decisions 
regarding starting a new business; Barber and Odean (2001) report that males tend to be more 
overconfident than females; and Dowling and Aribi (2013) find that women appear to be less 
overconfident in their decision-making regarding the level of acquisitiveness of a company.  
   By the same token, a number of studies examine the effect of CEOs’ characteristics on EM 
practices (Geiger and North, 2006; Jiang et al., 2008; Matsunaga and Yeung, 2008; Peni and 
Vähämaa, 2010). For instance, Peni and Vähämaa (2010) studied the association between the 
gender of company executives and EM among US S&P 500 firms, their results showing that 
companies with female CFOs are related to income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
Nonetheless, Peni and Vähämaa (2010) found no connection between CEOs’ gender and EM. 
Conversely, Gavious et al. (2012) found a negative relationship between the presence of 
females on the board and EM practices, and that EM is lower in companies with a female 
CEO/CFO. Srinidhi et al. (2011) provide evidence that the presence of women on the board of 
directors improves earnings quality. Similarly, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) found that 
companies with a higher percentage of females in top management are more likely to improve 
the quality of reported earnings than those with a lower percentage of female executives. Thus, 
female CEOs may have higher moral standards and be more trustworthy than male CEOs, and 
therefore be less likely to engage in EM or to manipulate corporate financial disclosures 
(Heminway, 2007). In addition, organizational theory indicates that females in business are 
associated with better organizational performance, as they make more rational decisions (Gul 
et al., 2011). The ethical behaviour in the workplace of both women and men has been widely 
examined, proposing that females and males display distinct differences in values and interests 
and in their tendency to become involved in unethical business activities (Gilligan, 1982; Betz 
and Boreiko, 1989). Males are more concerned with financial benefits and a successful 
profession, and are more likely to bend the rules or even break the law to attain competitive 
success, while females lean more towards appropriate relationships and helping people, and 
are less likely to engage in unethical issues (Betz and Boreiko, 1989; Mason and Mudrack, 
1996). Therefore, from the perspective of organizational theory and the findings of the studies 
mentioned above, the first hypothesis developed for this study is as follows: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between male CEOs and EM practices. 
 
    Some studies have attempted to explain the relationship between a CEO’s age and decision-
making processes. For example, Serfling (2012) assumes that older CEOs invest less than 
younger ones because the latter are more prone to take risks: experience grows with age. 
Serfling (2012) also argues that CEOs’ age has a significant impact on corporate financial 
decisions because younger CEOs do not have a previous record related to accomplishments. 
Similarly, Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Li et al. (2011) reported that younger CEOs are 
likely to make more investment decisions than older ones because they want to demonstrate 
their capability to stakeholders. Miller and Shamsie (2001), however, find that older CEOs tend 
to take more decision investments than younger CEOs. There is also evidence that the CEO’s 
age has a significant effect on mergers and acquisitions (Yim (2013). Lin et al. (2014) found a 
significant negative relationship between CEOs’ age and internal control quality. On the other 
hand, Bamber et al. (2010) reported that managers born before World War II are more likely 
to have developed conservative communication styles than managers born after the war. 
    Davidson III et al. (2007) investigated whether CEOs’ age and career horizon affect EM 
practices. Their findings indicate that companies with older CEOs, those nearing retirement, 
are associated with EM practices, as they are more interested in their current company’s 
performance and less concerned about the future, aiming to maximize their own wealth or 
pension. In addition, the upper echelons theory suggests that specific personal characteristics 
of top management affect the decision-making process. Based on this fundamental theory, we 
expect a relationship between the CEO’s age and EM practices. 
Building on the above discussion, we propose our second hypothesis as:  
H2: There is a positive relationship between a CEO’s age and EM practices. 
 
    According to the upper echelons theory, the senior manager’s personal characteristics affect 
judgment and decision making, and among these characteristics is overconfidence (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). Overconfidence is the tendency of individuals to consider themselves above 
average (Alicke, 1985; Kruger, 1999). Weinstein (1980) and Alicke (1985) reported that 
overconfidence is often seen in managers. The influence of CEOs’ overconfidence on corporate 
decisions has received significant attention in the academic literature; for example, Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) and Frank and Goyal (2009) documented that CEO overconfidence might have 
a significant influence on the variation in leverage across companies. Similarly, Malmendier et 
al. (2011) found that CEO overconfidence influences investment decisions. Ahmed and 
Duellman (2013) suggested that overconfident managers are more likely to be over-optimistic 
about their firm’s future performance and overestimate their own capacity to maximize future 
earnings.     
    Schrand and Zechman (2012) found a positive relationship between CEOs’ overconfidence 
and financial reporting fraud, arguing that overconfident managers are more likely to engage 
in fraudulent practices. Hribar and Yang (2010) indicated that there is a positive relationship 
between overconfidence and the likelihood of greater EM. Based on the studies of the effect of 
managers’ overconfidence on decision-making processes in general, and EM in particular, and 
consistent with the idea that overconfident managers are considered risk takers (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005a) who are more likely to disclose overestimated information and to 
underestimate risks, this study is motivated to examine whether CEO overconfidence 
influences EM practices. We expect a positive association between CEOs’ overconfidence and 
EM practices: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between CEOs’ overconfidence and EM practices. 
 
3. The model 
This study employs panel regression models (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Yip et al., 2011; Wang 
and Hussainey, 2013) rather than pooled regression, for several reasons. For example, the major 
problem of pooled regression is that it does not distinguish between various companies and 
times, unlike panel data which offers appropriate models for time-series studies. To examine 
the relationship between CEOs’ characteristics and EM practices, we use the random effect 
model: 
EMit = β0 + β1 CGENit + β2 CAGEit + β3 COVERit+ β4 FSIZEit + β5 FPROFit + β6 FINDUit 
+ β7 FDIVIDit + β8 FLEVERit +ɛI        
Where         
EMit = earnings management of company i in year t, expressed as a percentage. 
β = the constant. 
CGEN = CEO’s gender, taking the value one if CEO is male, and zero if female. 
CAGE = CEO’s age, measured by the difference between the CEO’s date of birth and the year 
of the study period. 
COVER= CEO overconfidence, the proportion of CEO share ownership, options, and stock 
exercise.  
FSIZE = company size, the natural log of the company’s total assets. 
FPROF= profitability, measured by ROI (net income before tax divided be total assets). 
FINDU= industry type, a dummy variable that takes the value one if the company is operating 
in industrial sectors and 0 otherwise. 
FDIVID= dividends ratio (measured as cash dividends divided by net income for the same 
period). 
FLEVER= leverage ratio (measured as a total debt divided by total assets). 
Ε= residual error. 
 
4. Research Method 
4.1. Sample and data selection 
The ASE lists 270 financial and non-financial companies divided into three main sectors: 
financial, industrial and service. Following previous studies, all financial companies (42 
companies) are excluded from the initial sample as they are subject to specific laws and 
regulations which might affect the results (e.g. Abed et al., 2011; Mathuva, 2012; Akhtaruddin, 
2005). In addition, companies with missing data have been removed from the initial sample. 
Thus, the final sample consists of 201 ASE listed companies. The study covers the fiscal years 
2008-2013, with 1,206 firm-year observations. Jordanian companies were selected as Jordan 
offers an appropriate as well as an attractive setting because of its characteristic financial 
reporting system and socio-economic environment. Also, the Jordanian capital market, as in 
other developing countries, consists of a relatively large proportion of family-controlled 
companies. In Jordan, the practice of corporate governance began in 2007; the Jordanian 
corporate governance code number 15 requires that all listed companies are required to increase 
the credibility and transparency of financial reporting, by adopting the IFRS. Data have been 
collected from the companies’ annual financial reports available on their websites. Tables I and 
II report the distribution of sample companies by sector. 
 
Insert Table I 
 
Insert Table II 
 
4.2. Dependent variable – EM 
The literature suggests that managers tend to manage earnings through accruals, since it is 
easier to manipulate them and harder to be observed by outsiders (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 
1995; Kothari et al., 2005). In this study, we use the Jones Model (1991) and the Modified 
Jones Model (1995) as the main proxies to detect EM; as a robustness check, we also employ 
the model of Kothari et al. (2005). The study uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals, 
rather than signed discretionary accruals, as we are interested in capturing the extent of EM, 
and using signed discretionary accruals rather than absolute value does not alter the outcomes 
from the analysis (Raman and Shahrur, 2008). 
The following regression equations are applied to measure current accrual: 
The cross-sectional Jones Model (1991): 
TACit = α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it / TA it -1) + β 2 (PPE it / TA it -1) + ε it   
The cross-sectional Modified Jones Model (1995): 
TAC it / A it-1 = α (1 / TA it -1) + β1 (Δ REV it - ∆RECit) / A it-1) + β2 (PPE it / A it -1) + ε it       
Where: 
TACit = total accruals 
TA it – 1 = the book value of total assets of company i at the end of year t-1 
∆REVit / TA it – 1 = sales revenues of company i in year t deducted revenues in year t-1 scaled 
by TA it – 1 
∆REC = change in accounts receivables 
PPEit / TA it – 1 = gross property, plant and equipment of company i at the end of year t scaled 
by TA it – 1 
α, β1, β2 = estimated parameters 
εit = the residual.  
 
4.3. Independent variables – CEO’s characteristics 
The first characteristic is gender, which is a dummy variable with the value of one if the CEO 
is male and zero otherwise (e.g. Nalikka, 2009; Andriosopoulos et al., 2013). Age is measured 
by the difference between the CEO’s date of birth and the year of the study period (Prendergast 
and Stole, 1996; Serfling, 2014). For the CEO’s overconfidence, several authors have built up 
various kinds of proxy. For example, Oliver (2005) estimated it using a consumer sentiment 
index, based on a monthly telephone survey to gather information regarding consumer 
perceptions about overall economic conditions; it considered opinions about both current 
economic conditions (40% of the index), and future perceptions (60%). Baker and Wurgler 
(2011) used an investors index as a proxy for overconfidence, but limited data made this proxy 
unsuitable to determine CEO overconfidence in the current study.  
   Other researchers argue that an overconfident CEO can significantly influence their 
debt/equity choice, and he/she will choose to issue more debt than their rational peers do (e.g. 
Ben-David et al., 2007; Hackbarth, 2008). This occurs because the biased CEO believes that 
the firm is less likely to experience financial distress than it actually does (Hackbarth, 2008). 
In Fairchild's (2005) asymmetric information model, overconfidence leads to excessive use of 
debt (Oliver and Mefteh, 2010). In the same vein, Malmendier et al. (2007) indicate that 
overconfident managers use a higher level of debt than rational managers. Thus, they will 
underestimate the expected cost of bankruptcy and will take on more debt to exploit its tax 
benefits. This method has its weaknesses as many factors determine the capital structure of a 
company (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007). Also, some researchers used the entrepreneurial status 
of a manager to indicate the degree of overconfidence, arguing that people who are 
entrepreneurs have a greater tendency towards overconfident behaviour (Barros and Silveira, 
2009). Campbell et al. (2011) and Andriosopoulos et al. (2013) estimated CEO overconfidence 
by a late option exercise, which is a dummy variable that takes the value one for those CEOs 
who have held an option at any time during the sample period until its expiry, otherwise zero.  
 
   Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b) developed four different types of overconfidence 
measurement: i) Long Holder, ii) Holder 67%, iii) Net Buyer, and, iv) Press assessment of 
CEOs. The first three of these measurements (Malmendier & Tate, 2005a) were based on the 
personal portfolio decisions of CEOs. Long Holder and Holder 67% use the timing of the 
option exercises to identify the CEO’s overconfidence, while Net Buyer uses the habitual 
acquisition of stock and options of the company. The Long Holder and Holder 67% measures 
both require comprehensive information about the CEO’s personal portfolio transactions in the 
firm’s stock and options (e.g. time, investment period of each CEO option package and exercise 
price). The Net Buyer measure was based upon the acquisition of the stock and options of the 
company. Malmendier and Tate (2005a) used the tendency of CEOs to purchase additional 
company stock, even if already exposed to company risk; if, during the sampling period, a CEO 
is a net purchaser of the stock and options of their own company, then the Net Buyer dummy 
variable is one; otherwise it is zero. The fourth measurement (Malmendier & Tate, 2005b) is 
based on the press assessment of CEOs, with a CEO being classed more overconfident if 
described by a greater number of adjectives such as confident or optimistic than those implying 
a conservative nature, such as reliable, cautious, practical, frugal and steady. The shortcoming 
of this approach is that the data can be very limited, as every article needs to be verified. The 
current study will therefore judge overconfidence by using the Net Buyer method, based on 
whether they were net buyers of the stock of their own companies in the initial six years of the 
sample. Overconfidence is defined here as being overconfident for all the relevant years. A 
dummy variable was established with one representing overconfidence and zero otherwise. 
 
4.4. Control variables – Company characteristics 
Following earlier work (Kent and Ung, 2003; Luo et al., 2006; Lim et al., 2007), this study 
adds several control variables to the analysis model: company size, measured by the natural 
logarithm of the company’s total assets; and profitability measured as return on assets (net 
income divided by total assets) (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008). Company types are a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if the company is operating in the industrial sector 
and 0 otherwise (Peni and Vähämaa, 2010). The dividends ratio is measured as cash dividends 
divided by net income for the same period, and the leverage ratio as total debt divided by total 
assets. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table III shows the descriptive analysis; the minimum EM, according to the modified Jones 
model, Jones model, and Kothari model is 0.001, 0.000 and 0.008 respectively, and the 
maximum values are 0.925, 0.870 and 0.826, indicating a considerable dispersion in the rates; 
the mean values are 0.097, 0.098 and 0.110. In addition, the median values are 0.060, 0.061 
and 0.059 with a standard deviation of 0.112, 0.114 and 0.110. This study employed the median 
value as a benchmark to classify high and low levels of EM. In addition, the table shows that 
95 per cent of the sample companies are managed by male CEOs, leaving only 5 per cent 
managed by females; this is an interesting finding which is close to the percentages obtained 
in the United States and United Kingdom (females both 6 per cent) and in Ireland, New Zealand 
and United Arab Emirates (5 per cent) (Grant Thornton International Business Report 2012). 
However, this is not surprising since the majority of Jordanian companies are owned by 
families. In terms of the CEO’s age, the mean value is 51.041 with minimum and maximum 
26 and 84 respectively, and a median value of 51; this study uses median age as the cut-off 
point between older and younger CEOs.   
   The results further reveal that 41 per cent of CEOs were overconfident about their companies’ 
future performance. Regarding the control variables, company size determined as the natural 
logarithm of total assets has a mean of 1,801,419, minimum 1,293,032 and maximum 
28,802,374, indicating a wide range of company size. Profitability varies between a minimum 
value of -86 per cent (Loss) and maximum 95 per cent (Profit), with standard deviation 12 per 
cent. The mean value of industry type is 39 per cent which indicates that 39 per cent of the 
sample companies operate in the industrial sector. Dividend ratio has a mean value of 18.8 per 
cent, ranging from 0 to 97.5 per cent; the median value is 0 with standard deviation 30.7 per 
cent. Table III also shows that the mean value of leverage ratio is 29.5 per cent, minimum and 
maximum values are 0.0002 and 0.9780 respectively; correspondingly the median value is 24 
per cent with a standard deviation of 23.2 per cent. 
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Before conducting the regression analysis, we tested whether there was an econometric 
problem in the model used to examine the impact of CEOs’ characteristics on EM practices. 
As a first step, the multicollinearity problem was tested by using correlation matrices. Table 
IV shows that the highest correlation is between the dividend ratio and company’s profitability, 
with a coefficient of 37 per cent. According to Gujarati (2008) a coefficient of ± 80 per cent is 
considered as the point at which serious multicollinearity problems might exist and harm the 
results of the regression analysis. Therefore, this problem does not exist among the data set 
used in this model. The variances inflation factors (VIF) results presented in Table V confirm 
that there is no multicollinearity problem.  
 
 
 
 
Insert Table IV 
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5.2. Panel Regression results 
5.2.1. Full sample regression analysis 
The relationship between CEOs’ personal characteristics and EM practices is examined with 
cross-sectional panel regressions, following previous studies (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 
2008; Peni and Vähämaa, 2010). Panel data is considered an appropriate model for time-series 
studies because it distinguishes between companies and varies over time, allowing us to remove 
any unobservable heterogeneity among our sample (Himmelberg et al., 1999). However, some 
econometric issues needed to be addressed, relating to panel data. First, Breush and Pagan’s 
LM test was used to evaluate the fit of the data panel and pooled models. The result of the test 
is highly significant at the 1 per cent level, and panel data is more appropriate (Gujarati, 2008). 
However, panel data models can be specified as fixed or random effects that help to capture 
the impact of companies and time-specific heterogeneities. To decide between them, we 
performed the Housman test. The outcome was not significant (P = 0.718), and hence we could 
not reject the null result of random effects. Consequently, we use the random effects model. 
   Again, the Pesaran CD test was employed to check whether this model has serial correlation. 
The test result was not statistically significant (P = 0.383) meaning that there is no serial 
correlation across entities. The Modified Wald test outcome (P = 0.621) indicated no 
heteroscedasticity in our model. The results of our random-effects panel regression analysis are 
presented in Table VI. The estimates are presented in three panels: Panel A reports the results 
of the regressions where the discretionary accruals are determined by the Modified Jones 
Model (1995), Panel B by the Jones Model (1991), and Panel C by the Kothari et al. (2005) 
Model. Regression analysis reveals that the values of R2 overall for the three models are 
relatively small: 0.21, 0.18 and 0.11 respectively. This indicates that the combination of the 
independent variables demonstrates 0.21, 0.18 and 0.11 of variation of the dependent variable. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that low R2 values are typical in this type of accruals regression 
(e.g. Davidson III et al., 2007; Jenkins and Velury, 2008; Peni and Vähämaa, 2010). Table VI 
also shows that the models are highly significant at the 0.015, 0.013 and 0.005 levels in the 
three panels, implying that these models are highly significant and thus have a good 
explanatory power of disclosure.  
   The results of the regression coefficients are presented in the same Table VI, showing the 
impact of CEO characteristics on EM practices. No relationship is observed between gender 
and EM practices, as the estimated coefficient for gender appears statistically insignificant; this 
result is consistent with previous studies (Rose, 2007; Peni and Vähämaa, 2010). Nonetheless, 
the lack of a significant relationship may simply be a result of the extremely small number of 
female CEOs in Jordanian companies. Thus, H1 is rejected. Similarly, the estimation results of 
regression analysis indicate no relationship between age and EM practice. This result does not 
support our hypothesis H2; hence, the formulated H2 must be rejected. However, the regression 
results indicate that overconfidence is positively significant with EM at levels (P = 0.024) and 
(P = 0.057) based on the Modified Jones and Jones Models, while the Kothari Model shows 
overconfidence is positively significant with EM at level (P = 0.089). This finding is consistent 
with previous literature (e.g. Hribar and Yang, 2010; Schrand and Zechman, 2012), suggesting 
that CEOs’ overconfidence is more likely to result in EM, and that overconfident CEOs are 
more likely to be risk takers (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a). This result supports H3, of a 
positive significant relationship between CEO overconfidence and EM practices. Hence, H3 is 
accepted.  
   Our analysis includes some control variables. For example, the regression results indicate 
that company size has a significant negative association with EM practices. Small firms are 
subject to less pressure from authority, and consequently, managers have more incentive to 
engage in EM practices. This finding is also consistent with many studies (e.g. Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005; Celik et al., 2006; Lim et al., 2007; Kelton and Yang, 2008). Conversely, 
profitability, industry type, dividend ratio and leverage ratio are found to have an insignificant 
influence on EM practices. Regression results disprove any relationship between these 
variables and EM practices. 
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5.2.2. Family and non-family sample 
According to the literature, discretionary accruals are higher in family companies than in non-
family firms (Wang, 2006), since the family-controlled companies are more likely to have 
higher profits than non-family companies (Ali et al., 2007; Jaggi et al., 2009; Almeida-Santos 
et al., 2013). However, the literature shows that most of these studies were conducted in 
developed countries, and no single study has been conducted in the Middle East region. This 
study is therefore motivated to examine the role of CEO characteristics in EM practices in 
family-controlled companies, a central issue in Jordan since a large proportion of companies 
are family-controlled. To this end, further analyses were performed, with the sample divided 
into two groups, family and non-family companies, using the Companies Control Department 
classification, 73 (36 per cent) non-family companies and 128 (64 per cent) family companies 
were listed on the ASE over the period 2008-2013. The estimation results of our random-effects 
panel regression analysis are presented in Table VII, revealing insignificant relationships 
between CEOs’ personal characteristics and EM practices among the non-family group. 
Conversely, Table VIII shows a high positive relationship between CEOs’ overconfidence and 
EM practices among family companies, consistent with the findings of Fan and Wong (2002). 
This relationship might be due to a weak monitoring process among family companies. In most 
family companies, managers are either members of the controlling family or closely related to 
it; this close association may direct managers to manage earnings to achieve the goals of the 
controlling family at the expense of the wealth of minority shareholders. Table 8 also shows a 
significant negative relationship between EM practices and company size. 
 
 
Insert Table VII 
 
Insert Table VIII 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, our objective was to investigate the effect of CEOs’ personal characteristics on 
EM practices. We used a sample of 201 non-financial Jordanian listed companies for the fiscal 
years 2008 to 2013, totalling 1,206 company-year observations. We focused on the CEO’s 
gender, age and degree of overconfidence as personal characteristics, employing random-
effects panel data regressions. The empirical tests indicate that CEO overconfidence has a 
positive and significant association with EM practices. These results are consistent with upper 
echelons theory. A possible explanation for these findings is that overconfident managers are 
more likely to issue further optimistic management forecasts, which will put them in a risky 
position in meeting forecasts for the future. Nevertheless, the results of our empirical analysis 
indicated no relationship between CEOs’ gender, age and EM practices among Jordanian 
companies. 
   This study contributes to the literature by investigating the effect of CEOs’ personal 
characteristics on EM practices. Furthermore, it introduces new empirical evidence that 
managers in family companies are more likely to engage in EM practices than are managers of 
non-family companies. Our empirical results illustrate which of the CEOs’ characteristics 
affect their decision-making process and consequently the financial reporting process. The 
reported earnings numbers should closely reflect the reality of a company’s financial activity 
during the reporting period, so our findings could be valuable for a number of users of financial 
information, such as regulators, investors, auditors and lenders, assisting them to make the right 
decisions about the firm’s future performance. For regulators, consideration of these 
characteristics could be relevant to the on-going improvement of corporate governance and 
financial reporting. Our findings are also important for board directors when considering the 
benefits and costs of managers, because their characteristics affect not only the company’s 
performance but also influence financial reporting decisions. The findings may have 
implications for other emerging markets, and also for financial companies. Future studies could 
examine in depth the reasons why managers of family companies are more likely to engage in 
EM practices. 
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Table I. Sample Selection procedure for the study period 
Description 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Pooled 
Initial Sample 270 270 270 270 270 270 1620 
Excluded: 
Financial industries 42 42 42 42 42 42 (252) 
 228 228 228 228 228 228 1326 
Sectors with six or fewer firms 
Health Care 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 
Technology and Communication 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Media 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 
Paper and Cardboard 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 
Utilities and Energy 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 
Printing and Packaging 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Tobacco and Cigarettes 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 
Glass and Ceramic Industries 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
(102) 
Firms with unavailable data 10 10 10 10 10 10 (60) 
Final Sample 201 201 201 201 201 201 1206 
 
Table II. Final distribution of the sample by type 
Description Number Percentage 
Educational services 26 12.93% 
Hotels and Tourism 38 18.90% 
Transportation 23 11.44% 
Commercial Services 41 20.39% 
Pharmaceutical and Medical industries 12 5.97% 
Chemical industries 15 7.46% 
Food and Beverages 17 8.45% 
Mining and Extraction industries 14 6.96% 
Engineering and Construction 6 2.98% 
Textiles, leather, and clothing 9 4.47% 
Total  201                          100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table III. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
EM modified  1206 0.001 0.925 0.097 0.060 0.112 
EM Jones 
EM Kothari  
1206 
1206 
0.000 
0.008 
0.870 
0.826 
0.098 
0.110 
0.061 
0.059 
0.114 
0.110 
CGEN  1206 0 1 0.951 1 0.214 
CAGE  1206 26 84 51.041 51 11.266 
COVER  1206 0 1 0.405 0 0.491 
FSIZE  1206 1293032 28802374 1801419 601.5 345.8517 
FPROF  1206 -85.90% 95% 0.0012 0.11 0.1217 
FINDU  
FDIVID 
FLEVER 
1206 
1206 
1206 
0 
0 
.0002 
1 
0.9751 
0.9780 
0.388 
0.1882 
0.2950 
0 
0 
0.240 
0.4875 
0.3077 
0.2320 
 
Notes: Where: EM modified = the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a measure of the degree 
of EM using the modified Jones model. EM Jones = the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a 
measure of the degree of EM using the original Jones model. EM Kothari = the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals as a measure of the degree of EM using the Kothari model. CAGE = CEO’s age. 
CGEN = CEO’s gender, 1 if male, and 0 if female. COVER = CEO overconfidence, the proportion of 
CEO share ownership, options, and stock exercise. FLEVER = leverage ratio used as another proxy 
for CEO overconfidence. FSIZE = firm size, the natural log of a firm’s total assets. FPROF = 
profitability, measured by ROA, return on assets (net income before tax divided be total assets). FINDU 
= industry type, a dummy variable, 1 if the company is operating in the industrial sector and 0 
otherwise. FDIVID = dividends ratio (measured as cash dividends divided by net income for the same 
period). FLEVER = leverage ratio (measured as total debt divided by total assets)
 Table IV. Correlation Matrix 
Variables CGEND CAGE COVER FSIZE FPROF FINDU FDIVID FLEVER 
CGEND  1.0000        
CAGE  0.0479*  1.0000       
COVER -0.0748** -0.1483**  1.0000      
FSIZE -0.0332 -0.0180  0.0148**  1.0000     
FPROF -0.0446  0.0167 -0.0079  0.0199  1.0000    
FINDU -0.1073** -0.0126**  0.0078 -0.0347** -0.0055*  1.0000   
FDIVID -0.0213  0.0927**  0.1170**  0.0688**  0.3714**  0.0034 1.0000  
FLEVER  0.0668* -0.1524**  0.2061**  0.0326 -0.1563** -0.0246 0.0347 1.0000 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01, *.   Correlation is significant at the 0.05  
 
Table V. VIF results 
 Variables  VIF 1/VIF 
FDIVID  1.21 0.826216 
FPROF  1.20 0.830191 
FLEVER  1.11 0.903875 
COVER  1.09 0.921649 
CAGE  1.06 0.944271 
CGEND  1.03 0.968654 
FINDU  1.02 0.981246 
FSIZE  1.01 0.989800 
Mean VIF  1.09  
22 
 
Table VI. Regression Results for EM and CEO’s characteristics full sample  
Panel A. modified Jones1995 Panel B. Jones1991 
Variables Pred.sign Coefficient      t Prob. Pred.sign. Coefficient t Prop. 
CGEN + .0084 0.50 0.616 + .0125 0.73 0.466 
CAGE - .0001 0.58 0.561 - .0002 0.08   0.938 
COVER + .0161 2.26 0.024** + .0138 1.90   0.057* 
FSIZE - -5.372 -2.17   0.030** - -5.611 -2.21 0.027** 
FPROF - -.0181 -0.63 0.528 - -.0145 -0.50 0.618 
FINDU 
FDIVID 
FLEVER 
? 
- 
+ 
.0001 
.0039 
-.0039 
0.02 
0.34 
-0.26 
0.986 
0.734 
0.795 
? 
- 
+ 
.0009 
.0083 
-.0028 
0.10 
0.71 
-0.18 
0.921 
0.475 
0.854 
Cons  .0238 3.22 0.001  .02434 3.38 0.001 
Adjusted R2 0.21   Adjusted R2 0.18 
F Value 12.998     F Value 11.041 
Panel C. Kothari et al. (2005) Model  
Variables Pred.sign Coefficient      t Prob.   
CGEN + .0110 0.67 0.504   
CAGE - .0003 0.11 0.911   
COVER + .0119 1.70 0.089*   
FSIZE - -4.561 -1.89  -0.059*   
FPROF - -.0123 -0.44 0.663   
FINDU 
FDIVID 
FLEVER 
? 
- 
+ 
.0044 
.0016 
-.0002 
0.50 
0.15 
-0.00 
0.615 
0.884 
0.999 
  
Cons  .0233 3.38 0.001   
Adjusted R2 0.11     
F Value 8,134       
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Table VII. Regression Results for EM and CEO’s characteristics among non-family 
companies 
Panel A. modified Jones1995 Panel B. Jones1991 
Variables Pred.sign Coefficient t Prob. Pred.sign. Coefficient t Prop. 
CGEN + .02194 0.94 0.345 + .01835 0.77 0.439 
CAGE - .0013 0.33 0.741 - -.0007 -0.18 0.856 
COVER + .0144 1.48 0.138 + .0111 1.12 0.262 
FSIZE - -2.6911 -1.26 -0.206 - -2.7911 -1.28 -0.201 
FPROF - -.0224 -0.59 0.556 - -.0278 -0.72 -0.474 
FINDU 
FDIVID 
FLEVER 
? 
- 
+ 
.01229 
-.0040 
-0.1424 
0.78 
-0.28 
-0.64 
0.433 
0.783 
0.521 
? 
- 
+ 
.0098 
.0008 
. -.0181 
0.78 
0.06 
-0.80 
0.437 
0.952 
-0.425 
Cons  .0334 1.44 0.150 
 
.0342 1.90 0.057 
Adjusted R2  0.16  Adjusted R2 0.11 
F Value  5,360  F Value 6.201 
Panel C. Kothari et al. (2005) Model  
Variables Pred.sign Coefficient t Prob.   
CGEN + .0143 0.63 0.528   
CAGE - .0048 0.12 0.906   
COVER + .0056 0.59 0.557   
FSIZE - -2.2811 -1.07 -0.286   
FPROF - -.0191 -0.52 -0.605   
FINDU 
FDIVID 
FLEVER 
? 
- 
+ 
.0122 
-.0016 
-.0121 
0.95 
-0.12 
-0.55 
0.340 
-0.907 
-0.580 
  
Cons  .0333 1.84 0.066   
Adjusted R2 0.13     
F Value 8,113       
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Table VIII. Regression Results for EM and CEO’s characteristics among family companies 
Panel A. modified Jones1995 Panel B. Jones1991 
Variables Pred.sign Coefficient t Prob. Pred.sign. Coefficient t Prop. 
CGEN + -.0010 -0.05 0.962 + .01835 0.77 0.439 
CAGE - .0001 0.32 0.749 - -.0007 -0.18 0.856 
COVER + .1144 1.48 0.038* + .0111 1.12 0.042* 
FSIZE - -2.6911 -1.26 -0.056* - -2.7911 -1.28 -0.05* 
FPROF - -.0224 -0.59 0.556 - -.0278 -0.72 -0.474 
FINDU 
FDIVID 
FLEVER 
? 
- 
+ 
.01229 
-.0040 
-0.1424 
0.78 
-0.28 
-0.64 
0.433 
0.783 
0.521 
? 
- 
+ 
.0098 
.0008 
. -.0181 
0.78 
0.06 
-0.80 
0.437 
0.952 
-0.425 
Cons  .0334 1.44 0.150 
 
.0342 1.90 0.057 
Adjusted R2  0.20  Adjusted R2 0.20 
F Value  8,364  F Value 8.201 
Panel C. Kothari et al. (2005) Model 
Variables Pred.sign Coefficient. t Prob.   
CGEN + .0228 1.07 0.727   
CAGE - -.0002 -0.08 -0.945   
COVER + .01726 2.03 0.042*   
FSIZE - -1.221 -2.90 -0.004**   
FPROF - .0202 0.58 0.565   
FINDU 
FDIVID 
FLEVER 
? 
- 
+ 
-.0067 
.0039 
.0102 
-0.65 
0.28 
0.41 
-0.963 
0.579 
0.934 
  
Cons  .0319 3.12 0.002   
Adjusted R2 0.16     
F Value 8,134       
 
 
 
